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Résumé / Abstract 
 
L’objectif  de  ce  cahier  est  d’examiner  l’impact  d’une  affiliation  syndicale  spécifique  sur 
l’augmentation  des  salaires  négociés,  étant  donné  la  syndicalisation.  Les  données  sont 
l’ensemble des conventions collectives de 500 employés et plus qui ont été signées au Québec 
(N=632)  et  en  Ontario  (N=1349) durant  la période 1985-2007.  Le modèle utilisé est  une 
équation salariale typique avec le taux d’augmentation salariale annualisé comme variable 
dépendante et quatre variables dichotomiques pour les syndicats spécifiques, l’IPC et le taux 
de chômage retardée de deux périodes par rapport à la signature, la présence ou non d'une 
clause d’ajustement au coût de la vie et 18 variables de secteur industriel. Nous ne trouvons 
sauf pour une exception aucun résultat indiquant qu’un syndicat obtient des augmentations 
plus élevées qu’un autre. 
 




The purpose of this note is to examine the effect of belonging to a specific union on negotiated 
wage increases, given unionisation status. The data consist of all collective agreements with 
more  than  500  employees,  which  were  signed  in  Quebec  (N=632)  or  Ontario  (N=1349) 
during  the  1985-2007  period.  The  model  used  is  a  standard  wage  equation  with  the 
negotiated rate of increase of base wages, annualized as the dependent variable and four 
dichotomous variables for a specific union, the CPI and the unemployment rate two quarters 
before the collective agreements, the presence or not of a cost of living agreements in the 
collective  agreement  and  eighteen  industrial  dichotomous  variables.  We  find  with  one 
exception no evidence that one union is better than another in obtaining higher wage growth.  
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There have been a large number of empirical studies on the impact of being unionized or 
not on wages, with evidence largely in favour of the existence of a union wage premium. 
Examples of such studies include Budd and Na (2000) who find a wage premium of 
11.4% (OLS estimate), Schmitt (2008) that finds a similar premium of 11.9%, but with 
variations across the wage distribution, from 20.6% for the low-wage workers in the 10
th 
percentile to 6.1% for the high-wage workers in the 90
th percentile and Even and 
Macpherson (2009) that show that the wage premium paid by large firms fell over the 
past 20 years. Results for Canada such as those of Fang and Verma (2002) also show the 
existence of a union wage premium.  
The purpose of this note is to examine the effect of belonging to a specific union on 
negotiated wage increases, given unionisation status. This is of interest because unions 
spend resources (time and money) trying to convince unionized workers to both not 
switch or switch from one union to another, arguing that membership in their union 
yields higher benefits. Yet there seems to have been no studies of the benefits of 
belonging to a specific union. What we have found are studies that examine the impact of 
specific unions on the expected duration of a strike (Gunderson and Melino, 1990) or on 
strike incidence (Gunderson, Kervin and Reid, 1989) for the case of Canada. Both studies 
use collective agreements as the unit of observation and include as control variables of 
little interest to the authors five dummy variables for specific unions (all others are the 
omitted group): these are for Steelworkers; Food and commercial workers; Autoworkers; 
Teamsters and Carpenters and joiners The first study shows that strikes by bargaining 
units of the Steelworkers and Food and commercial workers have a shorter duration, 
everything else equal. The second study shows that bargaining units of the Teamsters and 
Canadian auto workers unions are more likely to go on strike, again everything else 
equal. Thus different unions have different behaviour with respect to strikes; Bu do they 




Data, model and variables 
The data consist of collective agreements with more than 500 employees, which were 
signed in Quebec or Ontario during the 1985-2007 period
1. These were provided by 
Human Resources and Skill Development Canada. They are mainly for sectors under 
federal jurisdiction but also include some large provincial ones. These are the two largest 
provinces in Canada, accounting for 63% of the collective agreements recorded. We 
estimate results for each province separately since labour laws differ between the two 
provinces. In particular, Quebec has a provision against hiring outside workers (strike 
breakers or scabs) during strikes that is not present in the Ontario labour code.  
The model used in this note is a standard wage equation, used with similar data for an 
earlier period and without union variables in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990). More 
precisely, the equation estimated is; Wi = β0 + β1AFLCIO + β2CtWCLC + β3CSN + 
β4IndUnion + β5CPIi + β6COLA + β7Unemploymenti + Σj=10 βjIndustryi.  
W is the negotiated rate of increase of base wages, annualized.  
 AFLCIO, CtWCLC, CSN, IndUnion are four dichotomous variables that are equal to one 
when a collective agreement is with that particular union.  
CPI is the inflation in the consumer price index two quarters before the collective 
agreements.  
COLA is a dichotomous variable that is equal to one to indicate the presence of cost of 
living agreements in the collective agreement.  






 Industry represents the eighteen industrial dichotomous variables. Food and beverages is 
the reference industry, excluded in the regressions. The industries are: I2: construction; 
I3: textile, clothing and leather; I4: wood products, paper and printing; I5: petroleum, 
coal and chemical products; I6: plastics and rubber products; I7: non-metallic mineral 
products; I8: primary metals; I9: metal products; I10: machinery; I11: computer and 
electronic; I12: electrical equipment and appliances; I13: transportation equipment; I14: 
wholesaler and distributors; I15: grocery stores; I16: transports; I17: broadcasting and 
telecommunications; I18: administrative and support services; I19: accommodation 
services.  
Table 1 below summarizes the importance on the different unions. In Ontario, the AFL-
CIO is by far the dominant union with 59.5% of collective agreements signed while in 
Quebec, it accounts for only 36.7% of collective agreements. The second union in both 
provinces is the CLC but one notes that the Quebec based CSN accounts for 18% of 
agreements in that province.   
Table 1 
*Number of collective agreements by union, Ontario and Quebec, 1985-2007 
Union  Abbreviations   Quebec   Ontario 
Canadian labour congress                CLC (CTC)  182  423 
The american federation of labour 
and congress of industrial 
organization 
AFL-CIO                  232  803 
Change to win  CtW/CLC 
(Ctw/CTC) 
5 44 
Confédération des syndicats 
nationaux  
CSN 114  0 
Independent union                            Ind. Union.                  99  79 




Table 2 presents a fist set of regression results. 
Table 2 
The effect of a specific union on wage 
increases, Ontario and Quebec, 1985-2007.   
Negotiated wage increase as the 
dependent variable.  
(1)            
(Quebec)
(2)               
(Ontario) 
Constant 2,777  3,230 
 (6,14)  (9,33) 
Omitted union is CLC    
AFL-CIO/CLC union  0,360  0,052 
   (2,00)  (0,38) 
CtW/CLC union  -0,378  -0,406 
   (0,56)  (1,43) 
CSN union  -0,148  --- 
   (0,82)    
Ind. Union  0,178  0,230 
   (0,83)  (1,07) 
Inflation in the CPI  0,509  0,517 
 (14,52)  (15,90) 
Cost of living agreements  -0,473  -0,888 
 (3,11)  (5,63) 
Unemployment -0,089  -0,218 
 (2,61)  (7,23) 
Omitted sector is Food and 
beverages    
Construction   -0,724  0,560 
 (2,08)  (3,20) 
Textile, clothing and leather   -1,046  0,305 
 (3,98)  (0,87) 
Wood products, paper and printing  -0,149  0,157 
 (0,56)  (0,60) 
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products   -0,075  0,064 
 (0,21)  (0,20) 
Plastics and rubber products   -1,320  -0,286 





(1)            
(Quebec)
(2)            
(Ontario) 
Non-metallic mineral products  -1,046  0,050 
 (2,30)  (0,13) 
Primary metals  -0,516  -1,543 
 (1,96)  (5,43) 
Metal products  -0,677  -0,313 
 (1,20)  (0,91) 
Machinery -0,164  -0,721 
 (0,16)  (2,35) 
Computer and electronic  -0,629  0,176 
 (1,80)  (0,51) 
Electrical equipment and appliances  -0,799  -0,650 
 (2,24)  (2,07) 
Transportation equipment  -0,312  -0,280 
 (1,20)  (1,28) 
Wholesaler and distributors  -0,387  -0,048 
 (1,18)  (0,15) 
Grocery stores  -1,695  -0,340 
 (3,65)  (1,63) 
Transports -0,593  -0,696 
 (1,36)  (1,96) 
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications -0,541  -0,470 
 (1,36)  (0,69) 
Administrative and support services  -0,405  -0,458 
 (1,23)  (1,17) 
Accommodation services  0,984  0,557 
 (2,59)  (1,73) 
F 12,54  40,22 
R
2  0,341  0,422 
N 632  1349 
* t-statistics are in parentheses.  Eicker-White robust 




Looking first at the non union variables, we find the expected impacts of unemployment 
(-), inflation (+) and of the presence of a cost of living clause (-) on the negotiated wage 
growth. We find that only one (AFL-CIO in Quebec) of the dichotomous union variables 
is significant at a 5% confidence level. But perhaps our results hide some sectoral 
differences .We thus estimate our equation anew for the four Ontario sectors for which 
we have more than 100 observations, a cut-off used to ensure a reasonable sample size. 
This results in no sectoral estimations for Quebec. We report the results in table 3; we 
find no impact of a specific union on wage growth.  
 
The effect of a specific union on wage increases in 
Ontario, 1985-2007.     
Negotiated wage increase 








Constant  0,466  4,567  3,824  -0,872 
 (0,46)  (5,49)  (6,14)  (0,66) 
Omitted union is CLC        
AFL-CIO/CLC union  -0,563  -0,285  0,184  0,572 
   (1,34)  (0,45)  (0,62)  (1,06) 
CtW/CLC union  -0,114  0,092  -  -0,176 
   (0,16)  (0,12)    (0,24) 
CSN union  -  -  -  - 
           
Ind. Union  -0,646  -0,546  0,158  - 
   (0,96)  (0,78)  (0,30)    
Inflation in the CPI  0,946  0,779  0,030  1,118 
 (9,07)  (13,30)  (0,44)  (7,27) 
Cost of living agreements  -0,363  -  -1,246  -0,295 
 (0,96)    (4,15)  (0,58) 
Unemployment 0,022  -0,385  -0,115  -0,003 
 (0,24)  (6,64)  (1,81)  (0,02) 
F 16,82  85,51  7,88  28,35 
R
2  0,481  0,535  0,153  0,548 
N 116  377  224  123 
* t-statistics are in parentheses.  Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to 






Empirical studies on the effect of union on wages growth have been focusing on union 
wage premium. This note examined a different question, does what union represents 
workers, controlling for economic environment and sectoral variables matter in terms of 
wage growth? For the period of 1985-2007 in Quebec and Ontario, we find no 
convincing evidence that what union represents worker matters in terms of wage growth.  
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